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SEC V. SHIELDS: FOR INVESTORS, A BAD PRESUMPTION
YIELDS BAD RESULTS
ABSTRACT
Everyone knows the old saying about what happens when you as-
sume. But when you presume, and the presumption is bad, the results are
even worse. Currently, there is a presumption that general partnerships
and joint ventures are not securities. Therefore, if the difficult burden of
rebutting that presumption is not met, an investor who purchases a gen-
eral partnership or joint venture is not protected by federal securities
laws.
This Comment argues the presumption goes against the entire rea-
son federal securities laws were created: to protect inexperienced inves-
tors from fraud in the securities industry. The presumption creates a po-
tential loophole to federal securities laws. A promoter can create a prod-
uct, structure and describe it as a general partnership or joint venture, and
the product is presumably not a security and not subject to federal securi-
ties laws. If something goes wrong, the burden falls on the investor to
rebut the presumption and prove the product is a security. This burden
ranges from extremely difficult to meet to impossible, depending on the
circuit.
A better presumption, and one more consistent with the securities
industry as a whole, is to focus not only on the product being sold, but
also on who is purchasing the product. If the purchaser is an inexperi-
enced investor, the individual should be protected by federal securities
laws. They were specifically designed to protect the inexperienced inves-
tor, so no presumption should take that protection away. The only benefit
of the current presumption is a savvy promoter can get around federal
securities laws simply by naming a product a general partnership or joint
venture. No promoter should have that power.
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INTRODUCTION
In SEC v. Shields,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether particular Joint Venture Agree-
ments (JVAs) soliciting investments in oil and gas exploration and drill-
ing were investment contracts subject to federal securities regulations as
defined by the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) (collectively, the Securities
Acts).2 If not, the JVAs were not securities over which the SEC could
exercise jurisdiction.
The Securities Acts were designed to protect inexperienced inves-
tors from fraud. Currently, a presumption exists that general partnerships
and joint ventures are not securities subject to the Securities Acts. This
presumption creates an extremely difficult burden, which, unless over-
come, denies inexperienced investors the very protection the Securities
Acts were designed to provide, simply because the promoter was savvy
enough to call the product a general partnership or joint venture.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Securities Acts and two sig-
nificant cases the court relied on in reaching its decision: SEC v. W.J.
1. 744 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2014).
2. Id. at 636.
3. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. P'ship, 902 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
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Howey Co.,4 and Williamson v. Tucker.5 Part II presents the facts of
Shields, the procedural history, and the majority opinion. Part III dis-
cusses the circuit court split regarding if and how the Williamson test is
applied, as well as the power of the name and structure of an investment
in determining whether the Securities Acts apply, and also examines how
the district court might decide the case on remand.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Securities Acts
After the stock market crash of 1929, which led to the Great De-
pression, two important pieces of federal legislation were passed to regu-
late the securities marketS6: the Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.8 The Securities Act, often called the "truth in
securities" law, "has two basic objectives: [1] requir[ing] that investors
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities
being offered for public sale; and [2] prohibit[ing] deceit, misrepresenta-
tions, and other fraud in the sale of securities."9
Requiring securities to be registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) accomplishes the goal of disclosing im-
portant financial information about a security.1o Although there are cer-
tain exceptions and exemptions, generally securities sold in the United
States must be registered." Registration statements and prospectuses are
filed with the SEC and made publically available on the EDGAR.12 The-
se documents contain "a description of the company's . . . business; a
description of the security to be offered for sale; information about the
management of the company; and financial statements certified by inde-
pendent accountants."3
The Exchange Act created the SEC and gave the agency "broad au-
thority over all aspects of the [U.S.] securities industry." 4 The Exchange
4. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
5. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. W. Taylor Marshall, Note, Securities Law-The Securities Exchange Act of 1934-'Round
and 'Round We Go: The Supreme Court Again Limits the Circumstances in which Federal Courts
May Hold Secondary Actors Liable Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5. Stoneridge Invest-
ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008)., 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 197, 200 (2008).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2012).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-pp (2012).
9. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,




I2. Id (explaining that the EDGAR database allows users to search for companies and view
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Act gives the SEC the power "to require periodic reporting . .. by com-
panies with publically traded securities," to "identifly] and prohibit[]
certain types of conduct," and gives the SEC "disciplinary power[] over
regulated entities and [individuals] associated with [those entities]."
These entities include brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing agencies,
and securities agencies such as the New York Stock Exchange, the
NASDAQ Stock Market, and the Chicago Board of Options.16
B. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
In W.J. Howey Co., the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
ran to determine if a particular investment involving a citrus grove was
an investment contract subject o the Securities Acts.17 The Howey Com-
pany owned large tracts of citrus groves in Florida and planted approxi-
mately 500 acres of citrus groves per year. Half of the acreage the
Howey Company kept for itself and the other half was offered to the
public in an effort to finance further development.19 In the offering, each
potential customer was given a land sales contract and a service contract
to tend to the land.20 The Howey Company said it was not feasible to
invest in a grove unless service arrangements were made.21 Although the
service contracts allowed a purchaser to make arrangements with any
service company, the Howey Company stressed the superiority of
Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., a corporation under the same direct
control and management as the Howey Company.2 2
The land sales contract provided a price per acre and conveyed the
land by warranty deed to the purchaser.2 3 Each purchaser received a tract
of land not separately fenced from the adjacent land owned by other pur-
chasers.24 In fact, "the sole indication of several ownership [was] found
in small land marks intelligible only through a plat book record."25
The service contract gave Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. a lease
interest on each tract of land and "full and complete" possession.26 This
gave the company full discretion to use its skilled personnel and full in-
ventory of equipment to cultivate, harvest, and market the crops.27 The
purchaser had no right to market the crops because there was no right to
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946).








26. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id.
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specific fruit. 28 Instead, all fruit was pooled together for sale and each
purchaser was entitled to a portion of the profit.29 Most purchasers were
not residents of Florida, and did not possess the "knowledge, skill and
equipment necessary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees.,3 0 In-
stead, they were attracted by the potential for significant profits from
their investments.3 1
There are many different types of investment interests included in
the definition of a security subject to registration with the SEC.32 In an
alleged violation of the Securities Acts, the SEC sought to restrain the
Howey Company "from using the mails and instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered and nonexempt se-
curities."33 The district court denied the injunction and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the basis that "an investment contract is necessarily missing
where the enterprise is not speculative or promotional in character and
where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value independent
of the success of the enterprise as a whole."34
The Supreme Court held that the land sales contracts were securi-
ties, rejecting the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, and stated:
The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others. If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise
is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of proper-
ty with or without intrinsic value.35
The Court recognized the need for a broad definition of the term in-
vestment contract to encompass the many different types of instruments
that needed to fall within the scope of a security under the Securities
Acts. That definition, "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits."36
The Supreme Court ultimately held the transactions were invest-
ment contracts and reversed the decision of the lower courts. The lower





32. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294.
34. Id. at 301.
35. Id.
36. Id at 299.
37. Id. at 301.
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separate transactions involving no more than an ordinary real estate sale
and an agreement by the seller to manage the property for the buyer."38
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating they were investment con-
tracts because the Howey Company was offering more than an interest in
land or a farm coupled with management services.39 Rather, it was offer-
ing, to persons who lived in different parts of the country and lacked the
equipment and expertise to successfully operate a citrus farm, an oppor-
tunity to invest in and share the profits of a professionally managed citrus
fruit enterprise.40 These persons had no interest in developing the land
themselves, or even occupying it.41 They were "attracted solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment."42
The Court called it a "profit-seeking business venture . . . . The in-
vestors provide[d] the capital and share[d] in the earnings and profits; the
promoters manage[d], control[led] and operate[d] the enterprise."43 Fi-
nally, the Court made it clear the structure of an offering, not the name,
would determine whether it is an investment contract, and that an in-
vestment contract can take on many forms:
It follows that the arrangements whereby the investors' interests are
made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal
terminology in which such contracts are clothed. The investment con-
tracts in this instance take the form of land sales contracts, warranty
deeds and service contracts which respondents offer to prospective
investors.44
C. Williamson v. Tucker
In Williamson v. Tucker, the issue before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was whether certain real estate joint venture
interests were securities within the definition of the Securities Acts.45
Between 1969 and 1971, through a series of different transactions, the
land interests were sold to the defendants in three separate but similar
joint ventures.46 Here, the defendants owned a tract of land in Texas near
the site of the newly announced Dallas/Fort Worth airport.47 The transac-
tions were all arranged by Godwin Investments, and the defendants in-
vested in each separate joint venture.48 Each joint venture had approxi-
38. Id at 298.
39. Id at 299.
40. Id. at 299-300.




45. 645 F.2d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 407-08.
47. Id. at 407.
48. Id. at 408.
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mately fifteen investors, including the defendants.49 The purchases were
each financed by a promissory note issued by the respective joint ven-
ture.o
Godwin Investments created marketing materials that analyzed the
development of other major airport areas and suggested this was a simi-
lar opportunity, "[o]f course, an international airport of this immense size
will undoubtedly have a tremendous effect on the values and develop-
ment of nearby land, and its eventual economic contribution might be far
greater than the public's ability to presently comprehend!"5 '
In addition to marketing, Godwin Investments represented it would
"perform all management duties, including efforts to have the land re-
zoned from single-family residential to its best uses."52 Although God-
win Investments performed these activities, the participants in each of
the joint ventures retained substantial control and could vote to remove
Godwin Investments as the property manager.53 Despite maintaining
these joint venture rights, all plaintiffs claimed to have relied entirely on
Godwin Investments until late 1975 when they began to hold joint ven-
ture meetings.54
The court recognized the proper starting point for analysis of in-
vestment contracts is the Howey test and broke it into "three distinct ele-
ments: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3)
on an expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of indi-
viduals other than the investor."55 The third element, specifically the
word "solely," was the focus of the court's analysiS.56 Relying on a deci-
sion from the Ninth Circuit, the court said a broad definition of "solely"
was appropriate.57 The Ninth Circuit held that, "the word 'solely' should
not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an invest-
ment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not
form, securities."58 The rationale was that too strict an interpretation of
the word "solely" would provide a loophole to avoid federal securities
laws: by requiring investors to contribute some minimal effort, investors
would not be relying "solely" on the efforts of others, and therefore an
investment contract finding would be automatically precluded.5 9
49. Id
50. Id.
51. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 408-09.
54. Id. at 409.
55. Id. at 417.
56. See id at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973)).
58. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d at 482.
59. Id.
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Williamson further pointed out "the Supreme Court has altogether
omitted the word 'solely' in its most recent formulation of the investment
contract definition." 60 The court referenced United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman,61 which summarized the Howey test as "the presence of
an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expecta-
tion of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
forts of others."62
The issue in Williamson became whether the powers possessed by
the investors in the joint venture agreements were enough to preclude a
finding that the joint ventures were securities. 63 There is a circuit court
split on this issue-discussed in detail below-and this issue was a mat-
ter of first impression for the Fifth Circuit. 4 After analyzing a plethora of
cases over various circuits,6 5 the court found the Eighth66 and Tenth Cir-
cuits" approach to be most appropriate:
[T]he actual control exercised by the purchaser is irrelevant. So long
as the investor has the right to control the asset he has purchased, he
is not dependent on the promoter or on a third party for "those essen-
tial managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the en-
terprise."68
Accordingly, general partnerships and joint partnerships generally cannot
be investment contracts under the Securities Acts.69 However, "the mere
fact that an investment takes the form of a general partnership or joint
venture does not inevitably insulate it from the reach of the federal secu-
rities laws."70 There is a presumption "that the investor-partner is not in
fact dependent on the promoter or manager for the effective exercise of
his partnership powers."7 In order to rebut that presumption, the inves-
tor-partner must show the partnership powers were "inadequate to pro-
tect him from the dependence on others which is implicit in an invest-
ment contract."
72
An investor who lacks the necessary experience to intelligently ex-
ercise partnership power may be dependent on the manager.7 ' Reliance
60. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 418.
61. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
62. Id. at 852.
63. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 419-21.
66. Id at 420-21 (analyzing Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978), and Fargo
Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976)).
67. Id. at 421 (analyzing Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972)).
68. Id. at 421.
69. Id.
70. Id at 422.
71. Id
72. Id. at 423.
73. Id.
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on irreplaceable expertise on the part of the manager may force depend-
ence on the part of the investor.74 Inexperienced members of the general
public who had partnership powers but were led to expect profits derived
from the efforts of others may be able to show dependence. In essence,
"a legal right of control would have little value if the partners were
forced to rely on the manager's unique abilities." 76
However, hiring someone else to manage an investment does not
fulfill the reliance requirement.7 7 "It is not enough, therefore, that part-
ners in fact rely on others for the management of their investment; a
partnership can be an investment contract only when the partners are so
dependent on a particular manager that they cannot replace him or oth-
erwise exercise ultimate control." This makes fulfilling the reliance
requirement very difficult.
The court recognized how difficult this was, saying "an investor
who claims his . . . joint venture interest is an investment contract has a
difficult burden to overcome."79 In order to overcome the presumption
that dependence does not exist because investors in partnership agree-
ments retain control:
An investor must demonstrate that, in spite of the partnership form
which the investment took, he was so dependent on the promoter or
on a third party that he was in fact unable to exercise meaningful
partnership powers. A . . . joint venture interest can be designated a
security if the investor can establish, for example, that (1) an agree-
ment among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as
would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inex-
perienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapa-
ble of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or
(3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepre-
neurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he can-
not replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise mean-
ingful partnership or venture powers.so
None of those factors were present.8 ' First, the partnership agreements
82
gave the plaintiffs ultimate control over the joint venture. Second, the
plaintiffs were all high level executives at Frito-Lay and had participated
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knowledge to adequately exercise those powers.83 Finally, the plaintiffs
did not allege Godwin Investments was uniquely qualified to manage the
property or that their dependence on Godwin Investments made them
incapable of finding a replacement.8 Without one of those three factors,
"meaningful powers possessed by joint venturers under a joint venture
agreement do indeed preclude a finding that joint venture interests are
securities."
II. SEC V. SHIELDS
Williamson focused on the reliance element of Howey specifically
with respect to joint ventures, but courts continue to look to Howey as the
starting point when examining whether an investment is an investment
contract within the purview of the Securities Acts. Howey is regarded as
"the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that defined and gave life to the
term 'investment contract."'86 In SEC v. Shields, the Tenth Circuit adopt-
ed the Williamson approach and applied its three-factor test to rebut the
presumption that a general partnership is not a security.87
A. Facts
In September 2009, Mr. Shields formed GeoDynamics, a Colorado
corporation." The SEC alleged Mr. Shields sold over five million dollars
of interests in oil and gas joint ventures between January 2010 and May
2011.89 Marketing the interests involved making thousands of cold calls
to the general public.90 Potential investors were enticed by promises of
annual returns between 256% and 548%.9' At the height of the operation,
Mr. Shields supervised dozens of salespersons who each made over 400
cold calls per day.9 2 As a result, the joint ventures were made up of in-
vestors who had never met, never had contact with one another, and were
spread out across the country.93
Members of the general public with little or no experience in the oil
and gas industry were specifically targeted, and "Mr. Shields and his
staff would specifically emphasize 'the capabilities and unique qualifica-
tions of GeoDynamics as an experienced oil and gas driller and opera-
tor.'94 Anyone who seemed interested was sent offering documents in-
83. Id. at 424-25.
84. Id. at 425.
85. Id.
86. S. Scott Lasher & Eric B. Liebman, The Application of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. in Colo-
rado and Other Jurisdictions, 31 COLO. LAw. 73, 73 (2002).
87. 744 F.3d 633, 644-45 (10th Cir. 2014).






94. Id at 638.
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cluding a memo explaining how the venture would operate, a joint ven-
ture agreement, and a document that outlined the expected profits.
The offering documents state[d] "the Venturers will have all of the
rights and will be subject to all of the liabilities of a General Partner
under" Texas law, and also note[d] that GeoDynamics, as managing
venturer, "takes the position that the joint venture interest[s] are not
securities." Under the agreements, investors "expressly delegate[d]
management of the day-to-day Operations of the Joint Venture[s]" to
GeoDynamics as managing venturer.96
Under the agreements, GeoDynamics had broad powers and no investor
had any binding power.97 Investors had the right to vote, the right to ter-
minate the partnership or amend the partnership agreement, the right to
inspect accounting records and company reports, and the right to call
partnership meetings.98 The SEC alleged that Mr. Shields denied report
requests and lied to investors to "keep them misinformed, raise more
money, and prevent them from challenging his actions."99
According to the offering documents, each venture was to have its
own separate account where each investor's money was deposited to
cover the costs of the oil and gas exploration and drilling associated with
each respective venture.10' Instead, according to the SEC, all investments
were comingled and deposited into accounts controlled by Mr. Shields.'0
Of the five million dollars, Mr. Shields spent two million on general
business expenses, which was much more than the offering documents
allowed, and spent over two million more on personal expenses.102
These expenditures included: $747,685 on a private Learjet;
$236,444 on luxury automobiles; $31,537 on limousine and helicop-
ter rentals; $200,206 on rent for multiple residences; $104,734 on
sporting events; $26,434 on clothing and lingerie; $2,062 on jewelry;
$68,223 on home furnishings; $14,987 on electronics; $39,205 on
travel; and $467,129 to Mr. Shields via "cash withdrawals, checks, or
transfers to his personal bank accounts."
0 3
Of the five million dollars raised, only $613,494 went to actual oil and
gas exploration.'0 GeoDynamics never finished drilling, never produced
95. Id




100. Id at 638-39.
101. Id at 639.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 639 n.5.
104. Id at 639.
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any commercial quantities of oil or gas, and did not make a single pay-
ment to any investor in any of the four joint ventures.105
B. Procedural History
In September 2011, the SEC filed suit alleging violations under sev-
eral provisions of the Securities Acts.1 0 6 The SEC sought injunctions,
disgorgement plus interest, an asset freeze, and recovery of assets trans-
ferred to relieve defendants.0 7 The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss, which the district court granted without prejudice.0 8 The
district court held that "the SEC's allegations were 'insufficient to state a
plausible claim that the joint venture interests at issue' were secuni-
ties."1 09 The SEC filed an appeal, which argued the district court erred in
granting the motion to dismiss, claiming the joint ventures were invest-
ment contracts, and therefore securities subject to the Securities Acts.o10
C. Majority Opinion
Judge Seymour authored the opinion of the Tenth Circuit, reversing
the district court "[b]ecause it cannot be said as a matter of law that the
investments at issue are not 'investment contracts."'1 1 A motion to dis-
miss is not appropriate if a complaint stated a plausible claim for re-
lief.112 The SEC's allegations were sufficient to defeat a motion to dis-
miss.113 On appeal, the issue was whether the oil interests sold by Mr.
Shields and GeoDynamics were investment contracts subject o federal
securities laws.14
To provide background to the decision, the court described why the
Securities Acts were created:
Congress enacted the Securities Acts in response to "serious abus-
es in a largely unregulated securities market," and for the purpose of
regulating "investments, in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called." Congress "painted with a broad
brush" in defining a "security" in recognition of the "virtually limit-




108. Id. at 639-40.
109. Id. at 640 (quoting SEC v. Shields, No. I 1-CV-02121-REB, 2012 WL 3886883 (D. Colo.
Sept. 6, 2012)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 636.
112. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
113. Shields, 744 F.3d at 647.
114. Id. at 641.
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less and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits . . . .115
The court made it clear Congress did not intend for the Securities Acts to
cover all fraud, and it was up to the SEC and the courts to decide which
transactions are covered.'16
Neither side disputed that the first two elements of the Howey test
were satisfied because investors gave money directly to Mr. Shields as a
part of a common investment scheme."'7 The focus of the case was the
third element of the Howey test: "whether the investment was 'premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others." 8
The court noted the JVAs were labeled as general partnerships, and
in the Tenth Circuit there is a strong presumption that a general partner-
ship is not a security because investors retain significant control." 9 The
SEC argued the court should apply the Williamson factors to the third
element of the Howey test to rebut that presumption.120 The court agreed
and noted that the three factors in Williamson were a non-exhaustive
list.121 "[W]e view the Williamson approach as a supplement to control-
ling Supreme Court and circuit precedent in determining if allegations
are sufficient to raise a fact question regarding whether a particular in-
vestment is a security."l22
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting the
motion to dismiss123 because the SEC's allegations were "clearly suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption that the purported general partnerships
here are not securities, and to raise a fact issue concerning whether inves-
tors were relying on the efforts of Mr. Shields and GeoDynamics to sig-
nificantly affect the success or failure of the ventures." 24
The issue became "whether the investors actually had the type of
control reserved under the agreements to obtain access to information
necessary to protect, manage, and control their investments at the time
they purchased their interests."25 From there, each of the three factors
115. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,
60-61 (1990) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946))).
116. Id. at 642.
117. Id. at 643.
118. Id. (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 644-45.
122. Id. at 645.
123. Id. at 641, 648.
124. Id. at 645.
125. Id.
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from Williamson were analyzed to see if they were sufficiently plead-
ed. 126
First, a joint venture could be a security if the agreement gave the
investor so little power that the agreement operates as a limited partner-
ship.12 7 The SEC alleged the investors lacked the control of general part-
ners and actually had the rights of limited partners.128 The JVAs locked
investors into turnkey contracts solely with GeoDynamics as the contrac-
tor. 12 9 Although the JVAs gave investors voting rights, including the
right to remove GeoDynamics as the managing partner, investors still
had to rely on GeoDynamics as the contractor per the turnkey con-
tracts.130 Therefore, the "turnkey contracts were key to the success of the
enterprise and profits for the investors, regardless of the venturers' pow-
er, because they were the only way these oil and gas investments could
generate money."'31
The SEC also alleged Mr. Shields marketed the investments to indi-
viduals "with little or no experience in the oil and gas industry," and he
served as their only source of information.132 Accordingly, the SEC's
allegations were enough to defeat a motion to dismiss on the issue of
whether the investors here meaningful control.133
Second, the court considered "whether 'the partner or venturer is so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapa-
ble of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers."'l
34
Again, the court focused on the allegations of marketing to inexperienced
investors: "The allegations that Mr. Shields marketed these oil and gas
interests nationwide to investors with little, if any, experience in the oil
and gas industry by means of over 400 cold calls a day clearly supports
this conclusion."'3 5
Third, the court considered "whether 'the partner or venturer is so
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise
or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.'" 36 The
SEC alleged that during his sales pitches Mr. Shields specifically empha-
sized GeoDynamics' unique expertise in the oil and gas industry. He
claimed that GeoDynamics' experience was "so unique that he was able
126. Id. at 645-47.




131. Id. at 646-47.
132. Id at 647.
133. Id
134. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
137. Id.
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to offer-and investors depended on him for-estimated annualized
profits between 256% and 548%."'" These allegations, combined with
the fact investors had no experience in the industry and relied solely on
GeoDynamics per the turnkey contracts, sufficiently "raise[d] a fact issue
as to whether the investors had any practical alternative to GeoDynam-
ics."139 The court stated:
The district court focused only on the form of the JVAs themselves
without considering the economic realities of the transactions and the
investors' lack of access to information needed in order to actually
use the powers reserved to them under the JVAs. When the allega-
tions here are instead viewed in their totality, they state a plausible
claim that the powers were illusory, which is sufficient to rebut the
presumption that a general partnership is not a security.140
The court reversed the district court and remanded for further pro-
ceedings because it could not be proved that the oil interests are not in-
vestment contracts.14 1
III. ANALYSIS
The Shields decision answered one question, but several remain.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the full Williamson three-factor test, which
may rebut the presumption that general partnerships and joint ventures
are not securities. However, a circuit court split remains as to whether
and to what extent the Williamson test is applied. Remaining questions
involve the implications of naming and structuring an investment as a
general partnership or joint venture, the effect of the presumption and the
standard that must be met to rebut the presumption, and how the district
court will handle the decision on remand.
A. Circuit Court Split
The Shields decision made one thing clear; the Tenth Circuit agreed
with the Fifth Circuit's approach and adopted the three examples from
Williamson that can be used to rebut the presumption that a general part-
nership is not a security.142 Shields called the examples "non-
exhaustive"43 by pointing to language in Williamson,'" but did not pro-
vide any other examples that may rebut the presumption.
138. Id. at 647-48.
139. Id. at 648.
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id. at 644-45; see supra notes 68-69, 80 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 644.
144. Id. at 645 ("[N]oting that other factors could 'also give rise to such a dependence on the
promoter or manager that the exercise of partnership powers would be effectively precluded."'
(quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1981))).
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Perhaps the court neglected to expand that list because of the treat-
ment of the Williamson approach in other circuits. The court cited cases
from the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that followed the
Williamson approach;14 5 however, the Third and Fourth Circuits have
followed different approaches.146
[T]he Third Circuit took a legalistic approach, and established a
bright-line rule (i.e., an irrebuttable presumption) that a general part-
ner's interest cannot qualify as a security "because the role of a gen-
eral partner, by law, extends well beyond the permitted role of a pas-
sive investor." Although the general partner alleged that the partner-
ship agreement distributed control with respect to certain general
partners as though they were limited partners, and therefore that the
interests could be securities under Williamson, the court ruled that the
Uniform Partnership Act "puts its own limitations on the extent to
which a general partner can be so restricted" and that even "the most
draconian restrictions on the rights of non-management partners"
would not eliminate the "quantum of powers and responsibilities"
which would preclude the interest from constituting a security.
[T]he Fourth Circuit embraced the Williamson presumption,
but expressly rejected the second and third Williamson rebuttal fac-
tors. The court stated that a broad application of the Williamson fac-
tors "would undercut the strong presumption that an interest in a gen-
eral partnership is not a security" and "would unduly broaden the
scope of the Supreme Court's instruction that courts must examine
the economic reality of partnership interests."147
Each circuit presumes a general partnership is not a security, but
each takes a different approach to the question of how that presumption
can be rebutted, if at all: the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits embracing the Fifth Circuit's full three-part Williamson ap-
proach;14 8 the Fourth Circuit limiting the test to the first part of the Wil-
liamson three-part approach;14 9 and the Third Circuit taking the position
the presumption cannot be rebutted.150
145. Id. at 644 n.9 (citing United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2008) (apply-
ing Williamson and finding investment contract notwithstanding documents gave investors powers
of control similar to general partnership); SEC. v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755-57 (11th
Cir. 2007) (same); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Koch v. Hankins, 928
F.2d 1471, 1476-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Williamson to analyze whether general partnerships
were investment contracts)).
146. J. William Callison, Changed Circumstances: Eliminating the Williamson Presumption
that General Partnership Interests Are Not Securities, 58 BUs. LAW. 1373, 1376-77 (2003).
147. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730
F.2d 99, 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1984); and then quoting Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson
Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241 n.7 (4th Cir. 1988)).
148. Shields, 744 F.3d at 644 n.9.
149. Callison, supra note 146, at 1377.
150. Id. at 1376-77.
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The Third Circuit created a loophole around the Securities Acts by
completely rejecting the Williamson approach holding "that a participant
who holds a general partnership interest in an enterprise . . . does not
possess a security within the meaning of federal securities law."'5 ' This
interpretation gives future promoters the power to decide, depending on
how they structure and what they name their investment, whether it will
be subject to the Securities Acts. No promoter should have this power.
Rather, it is up to the SEC and the federal courts to decide which types of
transactions involve securities and, therefore, have the protection of the
Securities Acts.152
Unless the courts abandon the presumption, it is likely that unscrupu-
lous promoters will create limited liability partnerships in which vul-
nerable and unsophisticated general partners (the so-called "widows
and orphans" that the securities laws were designed to protect) invest
their money in schemes in which they rely on the promoter's efforts
to generate profits. These transactions will be undertaken without he
benefits of securities disclosure rules or regulatory agency oversight.
When the scheme fails, the promoter will argue that there is a strong
presumption that the interest is not a security and that the investor has
the burden of proving on an individual-by-individual basis that he
acquired an investment contract, thereby skirting rescission require-
ments and securities fraud liability.' 5 3
B. What Is in a Name?
The Williamson presumption has been "categorized as the last in-
vestment contract battlefield, i.e., whether or when interests in what are
held out to be a 'general partnership' or 'joint venture' are investment
contract securities."54 However, no cases have said what a general part-
nership or joint venture actually is.' 55 Unlike other business entities, gen-
eral partnerships and joint ventures do not have to file certificates with
the government, and the relationship among the parties to the agreement
can be anything they choose to stipulate in the contract. 156
Surely, naming an investment a general partnership or joint venture
should be able to have as much power as it seems: "A promoter cannot
evade the securities law simply by calling his otherwise obvious invest-
ment contract a 'general partnership' or 'joint venture' interest."'57 Out-
side of the Third Circuit, as stated in Shields, this is not the case, but the
truth is not too far removed. There is a "strong presumption that an inter-
151. Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1984).
152. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975).
153. Callison, supra note 146, at 1384.
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est in a general partnership is not a security."58 The Fifth Circuit reiter-
ated this principle: "To sum up: . . . . [an investor has] an extremely dif-
ficult factual burden if they are to establish that the joint venture interests
they purchased are securities.",5 9 Therefore, "by simply characterizing an
operation as a 'general partnership' or 'joint venture,' the promoter
seemingly automatically interposes a presumption that investment con-
tracts are not involved, so that anyone claiming they are faces some very
difficult obstacles to overcome it." 60
One argument for this presumption is that sophisticated investors
and institutions are normally the parties in these types of agreements and
have equal bargaining power in creating general partnerships and joint
ventures.161 They understand the risks involved, should be able to trans-
act as they see fit, and should not later be able to claim the protections of
the Securities Acts to recover their loss if the investment does not per-
form as expected.162 It is not against the law to make risky or even bad
investments, and as long as the investor understands the risks, the Securi-
ties Acts cannot be a fallback simply because an investor lost money.
The Securities Acts do not, and should not, afford that type of protec-
tion.163
But the Securities Acts should, and were designed to, protect inex-
perienced investors from fraud.M The courts should not impose such an
extremely difficult burden, which could deny inexperienced investors the
protection of the Securities Acts simply because the investment had a
promoter savvy enough to call it a general partnership or joint venture.
It would not be difficult for the courts to distinguish between a situ-
ation involving sophisticated investors or institutions and one involving
salesmen making hundreds of daily cold calls to thousands of members
of the general public whom they have never met.' 65 Accordingly, based
on the experience of the investor, it would not be difficult to decide
whether the Securities Acts applied. A presumption should exist, but the
presumption should also focus on the investor, not only the name and
structure of the investment. When an inexperienced investor purchases
something that looks and acts like a security, it should be presumed to be
a security protected by the Securities Acts.
158. SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 643 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Banghart v. Hollywood Gen.
P'ship, 902 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir. 1981).




164. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexactl934 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
165. See LONG & FEIGIN, supra note 154.
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The idea of subjecting different types of investors who invest in the
same product to different rules, is not a new idea in the securities indus-
try. The JOBS Act 6 6 recognized the difference between sophisticated
investors and unsophisticated investors and created exemptions to certain
rules if an issuer sells to an investor deemed wealthy and sophisticated
enough to be "accredited." 67 Therefore, there is precedent to apply dif-
ferent rules to investors with different levels of wealth and sophistica-
-168tion.
The reasoning for the exemptions [for sophisticated investors] seems
to be that offerings involving small amounts of money and/or small
numbers of investors pose less of a threat to the investing public, and
the investors involved are more likely to be sophisticated enough to
understand the risks of investment and are better suited to protect
themselves and bear the risk of loss.169
The JOBS Act places the burden on the issuer to prove investors are ac-
credited and, therefore, sophisticated and wealthy enough to invest in a
product not subject to the Securities Acts.170 If an investor is not accred-
ited, the issuer is liable if it sells that type of product to an unaccredited
investor. '7
Similarly, the difficult burden should be on the promoter to prove
the investors, who bought a general partnership, were sophisticated
enough that the Securities Acts need not apply. Reasonable persons
would not argue that inexperienced investors deserve the protection of
the Securities Acts. A presumption focused on the investor, as well as the
investment being sold, would result in a more organic application of the
Securities Acts to the type of persons the Acts were designed to protect.
This is not to suggest investors do not have a duty to protect them-
selves. If an investment sounds too good to be true, it probably is. It
should be a gut feeling, almost instinctual. Similarly, if it feels like the
Securities Acts should apply, they probably should.
C. How Will the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
Decide the Case on Remand?
In Shields, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision
granting the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.172 But the question remains whether the oil
166. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
167. See Joseph E. Richotte & Jennifer E. Consiglio, Benefits, Pitfalls, and Possibilities in the





171. Id. at *4.
172. SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 648 (10th Cir. 2014).
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and gas interests sold by Mr. Shields and GeoDynamics were investment
contracts, and therefore securities, subject to the Securities Acts., 73 The
Tenth Circuit analyzed each part of the Williamson approach and found
the SEC's allegations under each were sufficient to raise an issue of fact
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss,174 but the decision may have
done more than that.
Through an in-depth analysis of each of the three-part Williamson
test, the Tenth Circuit all but told the district court what its decision
should be on remand. The court said the SEC's allegations were "clearly
sufficient to rebut the presumption that the purported general partner-
ships here are not securities."175 While the allegations were found suffi-
cient to defeat the motion to dismiss, the claim that the oil and gas inter-
ests were investment contracts must still be proved in the district court.
However, the court's in-depth analysis of each part suggests the interests
were, at least in its opinion, conclusively investment contracts.
The first part of the Williamson test provides a joint venture may be
a security if "an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the
hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes
power as would a limited partnership." 76 The court found that even if the
investors had exercised their power to remove GeoDynamics as manag-
ing partner, they still had to rely on GeoDynamics for the success of the
joint venture because "[lt]he turnkey contracts were key to the success of
the enterprise and profits for the investors . . . [and] they were the only
way these oil and gas investments could generate money."1 77 The court
did not explain if this was enough to meet the first part of the Williamson
test, but it is reasonable to so infer.
In regard to the first and third parts of the Williamson test, it held
the SEC's allegations raised issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion to
dismiss.178 The court was even more transparent in its analysis of part
two of the Williamson test. However, the court's analysis of the second
part was not phrased in terms of sufficiency but of legal conclusion..179
Second, we consider whether "the partner or venturer is so inexpe-
rienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable
of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers." The al-
legations that Mr. Shields marketed these oil and gas interests na-
tionwide to investors with little, if any, experience in the oil and gas
173. Id.
174. Id. at 645-48.
175. Id. at 645.
176. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
177. Shields, 744 F.3d at 646-47.
178. Id. at 647-48.
179. Id. at 647.
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industry by means of over 400 cold calls a day clearly supports this
conclusion.180
By making this statement the court reached a conclusion of law, effec-
tively finding that one of the Williamson factors had been met.181 Im-
portantly, the Williamson test is a factors test, not an elements test, so a
joint venture interest can be designated a security if the investor can es-
tablish any one of the Williamson factors.182 The court did not expressly
state this was enough to meet the second part of the Williamson test, but
saying that it clearly supported that conclusion rather than saying it was
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss, as it did when discussing the
other two parts of the Williamson test, is a powerful message to the dis-
trict court.
The third part of the Williamson test provides a joint venture may be
a security if "the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he
cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise mean-
ingful partnership or venture powers." 83 The court focused on allega-
tions that Mr. Shields emphasized expertise "so unique that he was able
to offer-and investors depended on him for-estimated annualized
profits between 256% and 548%."184 Further, investors had no experi-
ence in the industry and were "totally reliant on GeoDynamics and the
turnkey drilling contracts for a profitable investment."88 The court did
not say this was enough to meet the third part of the Williamson test, but,
as in the analysis of the part one, it is a reasonable inference.
Shields all but wrote the district court's opinion. Only time will tell
if the lower court follows the not-so-subtle guidance of this decision, but
it is difficult to imagine how it could reach a conclusion that the oil and
gas interests were not investment contracts. Likely, determining that the
oil and gas interests were investments contracts subject to the Securities
Acts will be the easy part of the district court's decision. The more diffi-
cult part will be determining which sections of the Securities Acts were
violated. Hopefully, the district court delivers an opinion that punishes
Mr. Shields for what clearly appears to be fraud, assuming the SEC's
allegations are proved, and provides precedent that furthers Congress's
intent behind enacting the Securities Acts in the first place: to protect
inexperienced investors from serious abuses in the securities markets.
180. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
181. Id.
182. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
183. Id
184. Shields, 744 F.3d at 647-48.
185. Id. at 648.
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CONCLUSION
Currently, the presumption that general partnerships and joint ven-
tures are not securities remains. The Williamson test gives investors a
small chance to rebut that presumption if they can overcome, what even
the Supreme Court called, an extremely difficult burden.5 6 Even so,
there is a circuit split on how to apply Williamson, if at all. Unfortunate-
ly, the circuit split is not a simple disagreement as to whether general
partnerships and joint ventures are securities. Perhaps then the circuits
would be divided enough that the Supreme Court would step in and pro-
vide a better presumption to protect inexperienced investors, or at least
provide some certainty. The irrebuttable presumption in the Third Circuit
is the biggest outlier, and likely the only reason the Supreme Court may
address the issue. However, the lower courts, to some degree, agree on
the current presumption. Right or wrong, the Securities Acts currently do
not apply to most transactions involving general partnerships and joint
ventures. For now, buyers beware.
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